Why Importing Nayib Bukele to Fix Haiti Is a Dangerous Delusion

Why Importing Nayib Bukele to Fix Haiti Is a Dangerous Delusion

Every armchair geopolitics pundit on the internet has the exact same lazy prescription for Port-au-Prince. Look at San Salvador, they say. Look at the plummeting murder rates. Put Nayib Bukele on a plane to Haiti, hand him the keys to the National Palace, and watch the gangs evaporate overnight.

It is a seductive fantasy. It is also complete operational nonsense.

Pushing the "Bukele model" as a plug-and-play solution for Haiti ignores every single structural, economic, and historical reality on the ground. It mistakes a symptom for a disease. Worse, it assumes that an iron-fisted security crackdown works in a vacuum without a functioning state apparatus to back it up. Having spent years analyzing failed state interventions and watching billions of foreign aid dollars disappear into black holes across the Caribbean, I can tell you this: exporting El Salvador’s security playbook to Haiti wouldn't restore order. It would simply trigger a bloodier, more fractured civil war.

The Myth of the Plug-and-Play Strongman

The mainstream commentary around Haiti suffers from severe historical amnesia and a fundamental misunderstanding of what El Salvador actually possessed before Bukele took office in 2019.

When pundits ask whether Bukele could save Haiti, they are asking the wrong question entirely. They assume the primary variable in restoring security is political will—a leader willing to suspend constitutional rights, build mega-prisons, and throw tens of thousands of young men behind bars without due process.

Political will is cheap. Institutional capacity is expensive.

Before Bukele declared his state of exception in March 2022, El Salvador had a functioning, centralized state. It had a unified national police force (the PNC) and a disciplined, cohesive military (the FAES) with a clear chain of command. It had paved highways connecting major urban centers, a functioning electrical grid, an intact tax collection agency, and a banking system integrated with the US dollar. Most importantly, El Salvador had a territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of force that had simply been neglected by previous administrations, not entirely erased.

Haiti has none of these things.

To suggest that a Salvadoran-style crackdown could work in Port-au-Prince is like trying to run modern software on a computer whose motherboard has been smashed with a hammer. There is no centralized state left to wield the iron fist. The Haitian National Police (PNH) is outgunned, underpaid, and infiltrated. The Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H), disbanded in 1995 and only modestly reconstituted in 2017, numbers in the hundreds, not the tens of thousands.

You cannot execute mass arrests when you do not have the vehicles to transport prisoners, the fuel to run the trucks, the courts to process the paperwork, or the prisons to hold the detainees. In February and March 2024, Haitian gangs didn't just evade the police; they stormed the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, freeing nearly 4,000 inmates in a single weekend. Building a CECOT-style mega-prison in Haiti right now wouldn't house gang members. It would just provide them with a new fortified headquarters.

Street Gangs Are Not Warlords

The second fatal flaw in the "Bukele for Haiti" argument is the lazy conflation of MS-13 and Barrio 18 with Haitian armed coalitions like Viv Ansanm or the G9 Family and Allies. Calling both groups "gangs" is a semantic trap that obscures how they actually operate.

In El Salvador, MS-13 and Barrio 18 were fundamentally criminal extortion rackets. They functioned as parasites living off a working economy. They taxed bus drivers, corner stores, and remittance flows. Their power relied heavily on visible territorial markers—tattoos, specific street corners, and localized intimidation. While brutal, they were structurally dependent on the survival of the state's economic infrastructure. If the buses stopped running, the extortion money dried up.

Haitian armed groups are not parasites. They are the apex predators of a collapsed state.

Figures like Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier and Johnson "Izo" André do not operate like street thugs; they operate like warlords and quasi-state actors. They control the ports. They control the fuel terminals at Varreux. They control the major arterial highways linking the capital to the agricultural regions. When they shut down a port, the entire country starves.

Furthermore, the relationship between gangs and the state in El Salvador was largely adversarial, punctuated by secret, temporary truces negotiated by successive governments—including Bukele’s own administration prior to 2022, a fact his cheerleaders conveniently ignore. In Haiti, the gangs are not external enemies of the political class. They are the private militias of the political and economic elite.

For decades, Haitian oligarchs and politicians armed these groups to suppress voter turnout, intimidate rivals, and protect monopolies. Over the last five years, the Frankenstein monster broke free of its creators. The gangs realized they didn't need the oligarchs' crumbs when they could seize the entire bakery. You cannot use a state apparatus to crush gangs when the gangs and the state apparatus were forged in the exact same furnace.

The Logistics of State Collapse

Let's strip away the political rhetoric and look at the cold, hard math of security operations.

El Salvador covers roughly 21,000 square kilometers with a population of about 6.3 million people. To pacify it, Bukele deployed roughly 20,000 soldiers and 23,000 police officers. That is a security force ratio of nearly 700 personnel per 100,000 citizens, backed by centralized intelligence, aerial surveillance, and secure logistics.

Haiti covers 27,750 square kilometers of rugged, mountainous terrain with a population of nearly 12 million people—almost double El Salvador's population. The Haitian National Police currently has fewer than 10,000 active officers on duty across the entire country, many of whom are abandoning their posts due to lack of pay and death threats.

Imagine a scenario where a Bukele-style leader takes power in Port-au-Prince tomorrow. Where do the troops come from?

You cannot conscript an army overnight in a country where basic civil registries barely function. If you hand rifles to 30,000 desperate, unemployed young men without years of institutional indoctrination, rigorous vetting, and reliable payroll, you haven't created an army. You have just created three new rival gangs with better uniforms.

Look at the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission that began deploying in 2024. Even with international backing, funding from Washington, and vetted foreign officers, the mission has struggled to clear and hold territory. Why? Because clearing a neighborhood is the easy part. Holding it requires establishing municipal services, restoring electricity, opening schools, and paying civil servants. Without those things, the moment the armored vehicles roll out, the gangs roll back in. Bukele didn't just arrest gang members; he was able to plug them into an existing grid of state administration. In Haiti, there is no grid to plug into.

Answering the Questions Nobody Wants to Confront

When people search for solutions to the Haitian crisis, they are usually driven by a desperate desire for a clean, decisive fix. The internet rewards simple narratives. Let's look directly at the flawed premises behind the questions dominating this debate.

Could a foreign intervention replicate Bukele’s success?

No. Foreign forces lack the linguistic fluency, cultural intelligence, and long-term political mandate required for permanent counter-insurgency. Every foreign intervention in Haiti—from the US occupation of 1915 to the UN MINUSTAH mission from 2004 to 2017—ended with the underlying structural rot completely intact. In fact, MINUSTAH left behind a devastating cholera epidemic and a vacuum that allowed the current gang coalitions to metastasize. Outsiders can suppress violence temporarily, but they cannot manufacture legitimate domestic sovereignty.

Why doesn't Haiti just suspend civil rights like El Salvador did?

You cannot suspend rights that do not functionally exist. In Port-au-Prince, there is no functioning judiciary to bypass. There is no habeas corpus being violated because the courts are closed, burned down, or occupied by armed men. Calling for a "state of exception" in Haiti is redundant; the entire country has been living in a state of exception for years. Bukele weaponized the law to crush criminals. In Haiti, the law is a ghost.

Isn't authoritarianism better than total anarchy?

This is the classic false binary that traps commentators. The opposite of anarchy in a collapsed state is rarely clean, efficient authoritarianism. Usually, it is warlordism wearing a presidential sash. Look at the history of the Duvalier regime. François "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude ruled Haiti with absolute, terrifying brutality for nearly thirty years. Did they build a modern, prosperous state? No. They dismantled the professional military, created the Tonton Macoute—a personal paramilitary death squad—and gutted every public institution so no rival could ever challenge them. The current gang crisis is the direct historical descendant of Duvalier's deliberate destruction of Haitian state capacity.

What Actually Works When the State Is Dead

If importing a strongman is a fantasy, and conventional peacekeeping is a band-aid on a bullet wound, what is the actual path forward? It requires abandoning the obsession with quick kinetic victories and focusing on the unglamorous, brutal mechanics of state reconstruction from the ground up.

1. Sever the financial oxygen before firing a shot.
You do not defeat modern warlords solely in the streets; you defeat them in the ledger books. Haitian gangs are funded through kidnapping ransoms, port extortion, contraband smuggling across the Dominican border, and illicit money transfers from members of the diaspora and corrupt elites. International intelligence agencies—specifically the US Treasury's OFAC and the DEA—already know who the financiers are. Freezing assets, revoking visas, and prosecuting the elite patrons living comfortably in Miami, Montreal, and Santo Domingo will disrupt gang logistics faster than an armored patrol in Cité Soleil. If the elite lose their offshore bank accounts, their support for armed proxies vanishes overnight.

2. Build state capacity from the outside in, not Port-au-Prince out.
Every intervention fails because it obsesses over Port-au-Prince, a sprawling, ungovernable urban basin of nearly three million people. Haiti is not just its capital. Regions like Cap-Haïtien in the north or Les Cayes in the south have historically maintained far greater social cohesion and economic viability. Instead of pouring resources into a meat grinder in the capital, security and infrastructure investments must focus on securing secondary ports, regional airports, and agricultural corridors outside Port-au-Prince. Establish islands of functional governance, reliable customs collection, and basic commerce in the provinces, then slowly starve the capital's warlords of revenue and legitimacy.

3. Dismantle the weaponized customs apparatus.
The single largest source of legitimate state revenue in Haiti is customs duties at ports and border crossings. It is also the primary prize fought over by politicians and gang leaders. Until port security and customs collection are placed under strict, transparent, technology-driven oversight—removing human discretion and local political patronage—whoever controls the docks will always have enough cash to buy an army.

The Uncomfortable Truth About My Own Argument

I will be the first to admit the glaring weakness in this approach: it is agonizingly slow.

Telling a mother in Port-au-Prince who cannot buy clean water or walk to the market without risking a stray bullet that the solution is "provincial customs reform" and "targeted financial sanctions" feels obscenely detached from human suffering. People are dying today. Women are being subjected to systematic sexual violence as a weapon of territorial control right now. The human urge to scream for a ruthless strongman to kick down the doors and shoot the monsters is entirely understandable.

But empathy is not a strategy. History is littered with nations that embraced charismatic saviors promising instant order, only to discover ten years later that they had merely traded chaotic violence for institutionalized tyranny—or worse, triggered an even deeper collapse.

El Salvador's transformation under Bukele is a fascinating, controversial case study in what happens when a functional state decides to abandon liberal democratic norms to crush an internal criminal threat. It is not a blueprint for resurrecting a nation whose institutions have been systematically hollowed out for two centuries.

Stop looking at San Salvador for a miracle. If Haiti is ever going to survive, it won't be saved by importing a strongman from Central America—it will only be saved by doing the grueling, unsexy work of building a state that can actually hold its own weight.

SB

Sofia Barnes

Sofia Barnes is known for uncovering stories others miss, combining investigative skills with a knack for accessible, compelling writing.